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War and the Contest Over National
Identity
Roberta L. Coles
Sociology Department, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

This paper looks at a recent historical moment in which the American
national identity was defined and contested in the public arena. The Persian
Gulf crisis of 1990-91 presents a case in point in which official actors
attempted to define the American character and in doing so prescribed
particular actions necessary to fulfill what it means to be an American.
President George Bush’s discourse used the crisis to rejuvenate US prestige
and American confidence. He described Americans as unique in esteemed
values and America as the only country capable of leading the world. In so
doing, he invited American participation in support for US military
intervention. On the other side, the peace movement chose to emphasize
American weaknesses, domestic problems, and the gullible nature of the
American people. In so doing, it attempted to shame Americans into
supporting the anti-war movement.

Definitions of national identity run parallel to the criteria
privileged in definitions of nations. Territory and ethnicity have often
been viewed as integral to, if not identical with, nation, although rarely
are national boundaries coterminous with ethnic enclaves. The use of a
single currency, the patriotism embodied in national anthems, flags
and national heroes, a set of common institutions, and a single code of
rights and duties for all members are also considered essential to the
existence of a national identity (Smith, 1991; Triandafyllidou, 1999).
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In some contexts, the question of national identity is often simply ‘In
which country do you live?’
However, a nation is more than the land it encompasses, the
number or kind of people residing in it, or the political economy it
generates. Rather it is, in the words of Benedict Anderson (1991), an
‘imagined community’ invented through selectively remembered and
embellished events, myths, and other imaginings that conceive
comradeship and communion regardless of objective realities of
inequality and division. Hence, a national identity is more than just
which nationality box one checks on a form; it is more than just the
recognition, or even delight, that one is a member of a particular
national grouping. The reality is that an individual’s national identity
depends on a multitude of factors: ancestry, citizenry, language,
religion, and ideology. But it also depends on the immediate situation
in which one is pressed to claim an identity and the qualities and
richness of the collective identities offered.
According to Philip Schlesinger (1978), national identity is best
understood as a form of collective identity, which, as conceived by
Michel Foucault, is a discursive formation, a way of speaking that
shapes consciousness. At the same time, it serves as a terrain upon
which the content of that consciousness is contested. Like all collective
identities, a national identity is a dynamic system of social relations
and representations that is continually constituted and reconstructuerd
(Schlesinger, 1987). Little of the research that addresses national
identity as a collective identity addresses what characteristics
constitute any specific national identity and how communicative
practices and societal actors contribute to the construction of an
anthropomorphic nation (Schlesinger, 1987; Thompson, 2001).
This paper looks at a recent historical moment in which the
American national identity was being defined and contested in the
public arena. The Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 presents a case in
point in which official actors attempted to define the American
character and in so doing prescribed particular actions necessary to
fulfill what it means to be an American. In reaction, the peace
movement that coalesced during the crisis offered a collective identity
for its potential members and, perhaps unwittingly, challenged the
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official definition of what America is and what it means to be an
American. The repercussions of this contestation and the forms of
identity offered are discussed.

Collective identity, national identity and war
New social movement scholars have defined collective identity
as a set of attitudes, commitments, and rules of behavior to which
collective members are expected to subscribe (Friedman and McAdam,
1992). Such an identity is interactionally constructed (Hunt et al.,
1994) and constructed continually, changing over time (Stoecker,
1995). The realization of a common identity motivates participation
and enables the formation of a common will and a capacity for
collective action (Friedman and Adam, 1992; Norton 1988).
Specifically, Taylor and Whittier (1992) identified there components
essential to a collective identity: 1) a heightened saliency of common
characteristics (a sense of ‘we-ness’), 2) consciousness, the
interpretative frameworks that emerge from a group’s struggle to
define and realize its interests, and 3) a set of beliefs critical of, or in
opposition to, the dominant order. This latter criterion unnecessarily
restricts the concept of collective identity to social movements, when
clearly other collectivities, such as nations, also have identities.
While a national identity may not be adversarially juxtaposed to
a dominant order, it is imagined in a context of other nations. As
Edward Shils (1995) suggests, a national collective self-consciousness
entails at least an awareness of other collectivities and an evaluation
of self and others. Even when a nation has lost its territoriality, a
national identity, nevertheless, locates a particular nation relative to
others in the world community. That location may not necessarily be in
opposition to the world order or to other nations in the world order,
but the process of situating one nation among many frequently results
in stereotypical ‘us’ and ‘them’ conceptions, which, as Michael Billig
(1995), notes, are spoken of as if they result from genetic inheritance.
National identity is daily defined and passed on through a
process of political socialization through the arts, media, education,
and family. In fact, the process of imagining the national identity is so
commonplace that a number of scholars have pointed out that national
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identity is often imperceptibly present, having a taken-for-granted or
banal quality (Billig, 1995; Thompson, 2001). However, there are
times when national identity becomes more salient. Nothing calls forth
more compelling national discourse and an intense need to define or
defend national identity than international conflict or war (Bloom,
1990; Calhoun, 1997; McCrone et al., 1998). Indeed, under such a
therat, assert Andersen (1991) and Hedetoft (1993), a strong national
identity eventually moves its members to self-sacrifice, to a
willingness to die for it.
War itself is often analyzed in terms of its geopolitical functions,
and the rhetoric that usually attends armed conflict is frequently
analyzed in terms of its ability to legitimate war (Dionisopoulos and
Goldzwig, 1992; Holsti, 1962; and Ivie, 1974). Occasionally, war is
viewed as an individual leader’s means to self-legitimation. For
example, Richard Barnet’s 1990 book on presidents and war posits as
truism that presidents build their reputations on foreign policy. He
cites Ronald Reagan’s assault on Gernada just two days after 241
marines had been killed in Lebanon as one instance of warring to make
a president look strong (through rhetorically Reagan himself claimed
that the success of the Grenada attack proved America was strong
again).
A few anthropologists and psychologists have recognized that
war or other forms of violence performs intrinsic functions for the
individual participant. For instance, war can fulfill the warrior’s riskseeking or play needs (Clarke, 1986). According to Georges Sorel
(1941), forms of violence can enhance the individual’s selfdevelopment through the alleviation of boredom or piqued creativity
and confidence. Franz Fanon (1968) believed violence could lead to
personal responsibility and freedom. (See Grundy and Weinstein
(1974) for a nice summary of intrinsic justifications of violence.)
But war and its words can be a means by which a society,
including those who don’t do the actual fighting, defines its national
character and legitimates its existence, thereby creating or rekindling
a collective identity. At minimum, according to anthropologist Carol
Greenhouse (1986), the ability of a society to mobilize for war may be
perceived by the members as a sign that their social order is viable.
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However, one might infer then that the nation’s sense of viability is
greatly dependent on the effectiveness or outcome of the mobilization.
Without minimizing the role that a war’s outcome can play.1 I would
posit that regardless of outcome war mobilization offers a ‘teachable
moment’ for presidents, an opportunity to spell out specific national
qualities that supposedly make a particular nation distinct. In so doing,
presidents socialize the nation’s members about their collective
identity, defining who they are as a sum of individuals, and what their
collective role is in the community of nations.
As stated earlier, most identity theories hold that identities of
any variety (individual or collective) are formed in a context of
juxtaposed categories: that is, one identity can not be defined except
in comparison to another, just as some would say that love can’t be
fully understood without hate, nor joy without pain. Alexander Wendt
(1992) postulates that the emergence of a common ‘other’ is a factor
that facilitates collective state identity. Similarly, Ivar Neumann (1999)
posits that international relations in general are essentially self/other
relations. In his book, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European
Identity Formation. Neumann argues that the European creation of a
“Turkish Other” and a “Russian Other” have played important roles in
defining what Europeans are or at least what they are not. As an
instance of conflictual international relations, war readily creates an
‘other,’ usually an adversarial other in the form of a country, an ethnic,
religious, or ideological group, or a leader. By defining these others as
‘uncivilized,’ ‘barbarian,’ ‘backward,’ ‘evil,’ etc., a nation begins to
define its own identity boundaries.
The deployment of such oppositional identity categories was
prevalent in Bush’s discourse during the Gulf crisis. Bush’s categories
tended to be broad and dualistic. For instance, Bush distinguished
between force and aggression. According to Bush, aggression, which is
what Hussein committed, was evil and force, which was Bush was
about do, was good. Force is not aggression: it is punishment of
aggression.3 Bush also pointed out that Hussein’s war methods, such
as the SCUDS, were inferior and weapons of terror, while US ‘smart’
weapons were superior. Another distinction Bush used was that
between the civilized world and the uncivilized, atavistic Hussein.
Finally, Hussein aws associated with Hitler.4 According to Philip
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Wander’s (1984) and Mary Stuckey’s (1992 and 1995) work on
‘prophetic dualism,’ the effects of this rhetorical strategy are to
essentially divide the world into two camps, stifle debate, discourage
consideration of alternatives, and demand total victory of good over
evil. However, much has been written about the demonization of
Saddam Hussein (Rojo, 1995 and Spellman and Holyoak, 1992), so
that aspect will not be addressed further here.
Moreover, military battles are frequently accompanied by
discursive battles at home between pro-war administration and antiwar social movements. While the direct intent of the discourses of
these two adversaries may be to recruit supporters and articulate
pragmatic and ideological justification for and against war, in this case
they simultaneously painted a landscape of America as a nation among
nations and a portrait of the character of the American people, which
was then offered to the public for adoption.
This case study looks at that discursive battle over what is
America and what it means to be American. The data analyzed are the
seven months of press conferences, exchanges with reporters,
speeches given by President George Bush made to various audiences.
These 285 documents were all recorded in the Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents (WCPD) from August 2, 1990, the day Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait, through the six-week war, which began
January 16, 1991, and ended February 27, 1991. In addition, printed
data, such as press releases, memos, letters to the editors, mailing to
memberships, rally flyers, educational material, were obtained from
two national peace groups – the National Campaign for Peace in the
Middle East (NCPME) and the Military Families Support Network
(MFSN).
The MFSN and the NCPME were both formed in reaction to the
Gulf crisis. In this sense, they were both new organizations. Both had
prevention of the Persian Gulf War as their primary short-term goal.
They were both national organizations in that they each drew their
supporters from across the United States. The MFSN was
headquartered in America’s heartland in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and
the majority of people associated with the MFSN were relatives of US
military personnel serving in the Gulf. The NCPME, headquartered in
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New York, was a coalition of more than 200 ‘peace and justice groups,’
including SANE/Freeze, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Society of Friends,
National Council of Churches, and others. While the two peace
organizations had any significant differences in their structure and
collective self-identities (see Coles, 1999), their discourse about
American national identity will be treated as a whole, with significant
differences noted.
Unlike Bush’s documentation, little of the peace movement,
discourse was systematically gathered and held for public use, so only
73 pieces of data were analyzed for the peace movement. All of the
data was repeatedly analyzed and categorized in terms of the
qualities, values, and actions Bush or the peace movement attributed
to the nation of its members.

Political context of the gulf crisis
In 1990, as the Cold War was coming to an end and the United
States’ major enemy, the Soviet Union, was losing control of
numerous East European countries and suffering its own demise, it
might have been thought that American national identity would have
been secure. But, as Lance Bennett (1980: 166) has said, ‘new
political situation seem to fall quickly into old symbolic molds.’ While
the disintegration of the ‘evil empire,’ on one hand, appeared as a
victory for western capitalism and its leader, the United States, it also
entailed a decline in the need for a military giant. The US Pentagon
reluctantly embarked on the downsizing of its armed forces and bases.
At the same time, the United States’ status as an economic leader was
precarious, stemming from strong competition from Japan and
Germany.
Prior to this process, a crisis in US public mythology had
developed over the past several decades as well (Slotkin, 1992). The
United States had suffered its first major military loss in Vietnam,
which gave rise to the supposed psychological paralysis that came to
be called the ‘Vietnam Syndrome.’ The 1973 Arab oil boycott and the
1979-80 Iran hostage crisis seemed to prove that America no longer
had a freehand in the world. The 1983 US intervention in Lebanon
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resulted in an embarrassing military debacle in which nearly 250 US
soldiers were killed in a suicide bomb attack on their compound.
Although the Reagan and Bush administration successfully
pulled off several foreign interventions, such as in Panama and
Grenada, these paled in size to the Gulf crisis, which over a sevenmonth period entailed the deployment of 250,000 US military
personnel, the largest development since the Vietnam War. The former
military escapades had been quick strategic interventions: this was
war.
Meanwhile, political pundits said the American public was
experiencing a ‘malaise.’ The 1987 publication of Yale historian Paul
Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers contributed to
this malaise by concluding that America was experiencing grave and
irreversible economic and military decline.5 Time magazine noted that
Americans had been haunted by the ghosts of the Vietnam era: selfdoubt, fear of power, divisiveness, and a fundamental uncertainty
about America’s purpose in the world (Cloud, 1991). Moreover,
according to Bruce Miroff’s (1998) study of the presidential image
during the latter half of the Twentieth Century, President Bush took
office during an era when Americans was less deferential and more
cynical, and the presidential image had deteriorated in the eyes of
most Americans. Even Bush himself was seen as a postmodern
president with little ability to shape global affairs, or more colloquially
known as the ‘wimp factor’ (Rose, 1991).
The objective validity of this assessment of America’s well being
is not the subject here: the perception of reality matters here. In
August 1990, apparently heeding the above assessment of a
debilitated US mood and capabilities, President Saddam Hussein of
Iraq invaded its southerly neighbor Kuwait, a small but wealthy oil
kingdom, and claimed ownership of disputed oil fields lying beneath
the two countries’ borders. During the next seven months President
George Bush orchestrated the first large-scale war since Vietnam. To
accomplish this, he needed more than guns and ammunition: he
needed a motivating vocabulary to accomplish two rhetorical goals.
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First, in the short-run, Bush had to do what, according to John
Murphy (1992) and Ernest Bormann (1985), any war requires – create
a united rhetorical community, rendering it willing to use all available
resources to repulse a threat. Because of the high stakes involved in
war, pragmatic justifications (such as oil, jobs, or a way of life) alone
cannot muster the public support essential to an elected commanderin-chief. Cecil Crabb, Jr. once wrote that American foreign policy is
pragmatic consideration, but leaders still must utilize ideals to
legitimize their policy. Without at least the appearance of a worthwhile
human purpose, such policy would be unlikely to succeed.6
The goal was more difficult in the Persian gulf than it had been
in the previous Central American interventions because the Gulf was
farther from the United States, little knowledge or sympathy for Arab
oil kingdoms existed previously among the American public, and the
United States had few military bases in the region. Bush needed time
to establish those bases and deploy the personnel and equipment to
meet the military challenge. This lengthy military buildup, hefty
deployment, and costly intervention created more potential for public
awareness and debate of US policy in the Gulf, so Bush’s discursive
strategy required transcendent emotional appeals that addressed the
nation en toto, whether or not all its members were directly affected
by the war.
A second goal was to seize the opportunity to dispel self-doubt
and restore American virtue, credibility, and leadership, at home as
well as abroad. This became especially clear during the war, when
Bush spoke directly about what the struggle was achieving for America
in terms of overcoming the public malaise and for reestablishing
credibility and a leadership role in the world community. About a week
before the end of the war, Bush (1991: 183) stated to reporters that
upon the war’s end, his hope would be that
we will have kicked, for once and for all, the so-called Vietnam
syndrome …And that sends a strong signal for the future – that
we’re credible, we’re committed to peace, we’re committed to
justice, and we are determined to fulfill our obligations in trying
to bring about a more peaceful world order.7
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A few days after the war’s end, Bush (1991: 233) announced that this
goal had been achieved. Later in the day at a press conference, he
remarked on several occasions about the new mood of patriotism
overcoming the people. ‘In towns and cities across this nation, our
citizens have felt a sense of purpose and unity in the accomplishment
of our military that is a welcome addition to the American spirit’ (Bush,
1991: 234, 237, 238).
With these two goals – motivating support and re-igniting a
vigorous American identity – in mind, Bush’s discourse is replete with
descriptions and anecdotes about what America and Americans are
and what values and personality characteristics they supposedly hold
in common. American national character according to Bush:
In the life of a nation, we’re called upon to define who we are
and what we believe. Sometimes these choices are not easy.
(George Bush, 1990: 1216, as he announced to the nation the
deployment of American troops to Saudi Arabia.)
We could safely assume, though, it has been documented as well, that
a nation’s self-assessment will often emphasize its real or perceived
virtues over its weaknesses. Various studies have noted that numerous
peoples have held or continue to hold a self-image of superiority,
uniqueness, and/or chosenness.8 Although America may be
exceptional in a number of respects, it is no exception in that respect.
Throughout its history, America’s leaders and many of its elite, have
gazed into the mirror, inquired ‘who is the fairest country of them all?’
and saw the answer reflecting back at them.
So, when in Executive Order 12722 (August 2, 1990), Bush
declared Saddam Hussein’s invasion a threat to American national
security, he essentially began a seven-month esteem-building
campaign. Bush’s list of American qualities and his use of superlatives
(the ‘finest, most loving nation’10, ‘greatest nation, freest nation’11, or
‘only’ nation)12 indicated that he saw America as the unique
embodiment of only the highest character qualities.
Once again, our people, the people of our country have come
together to show the world our finest strengths: American
optimism, unity, unselfishness, the world values of family, and
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the will to stand up for what’s right and good – strengths that
form the very heart of America and that make possible the
freedoms our brave service men and women are striving to
defend (Bush, 1990: 1410).
His list of American qualities was apparently unlimited, but I have
grouped the various qualities into several larger categorise, ‘esteemed
values’, ‘active Americans,’ ‘unique leaders,’ and ‘brave and sacrificial,’
all of which intersect within Bush’s discourse.

Esteemed values and qualities
Several personal and political or civic values appeared
repeatedly in Bush’s rhetoric. First, Bush described Americans as a
peace-loving people. However, Bush made it clear that peace-loving
should not be confused with passivity or indecisiveness. Indeed, most
common among the keywords defining America were ‘standing,’
‘determination,’ ‘resolute,’ and ‘steadfast.’ For instance, in his speech
to the Iraqis, Bush (1990: 1390) assured them that
No one – not the American people, not this President – wants
war. But there are times when a country, when all countries
who value the principles of sovereignty and independence, must
stand against aggression. As Americans, we’re slow to raise our
hand in anger and eager to explore every peaceful means of
settling our disputes; but when we have exhausted every
alternative, when conflict is thrust upon us, there is no nation
on Earth with greater resolve or stronger steadiness of
purpose.14
Secondly, Bush elevated the value of friendship, particularly in
the first two to three months of the crisis, when Bush used the
designation of ‘friend’ to demarcate the world into two camps (i.e.,
basically those who voted with the United States at the United Nations
or in the Arab League and those who did not), US ‘friends’ included the
Western allies, particularly Britain, as a given. Bush made a point to
say that Turkey, which allowed the United States use of military bases,
was a “staunch friend.” Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen were
included on the list, but by mid-August, the latter two were in the
process of losing that status due to their hesitancy to support US
military action. Interestingly, Kuwait was not mentioned among the list
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of friends. Indeed, little was said about Kuwait until mid- to lateSeptember, shortly before the visit of Kuwait’s Amir on the 28th. It
was the Amir’s first visit ever to the United States, which may help
explain why Kuwait was not specifically mentioned on the US list of
friends. Loyalty or commitment to friends became an important and
repeated motive in the crisis. Bush assured the world that it would be
a great mistake to underestimate America’s commitment to imperiled
friends. For example, Bush (1990: 1256) told Department of Defence
employees: ‘What is at stake is truly vital. Our action in the Gulf is
about fighting aggression and preserving the sovereignty of nations. It
is about keeping our word, our solemn word of honor, and standing by
old friends.”15
Third, America was, by and large, a principled country, a
country that was by nature part of something larger than itself,16 a
country that would find it contrary to its nature to look aside when evil
needs defeating or transcending principles require defending.
Standing up for our principles will not become easy…Standing
up for our principle is an American tradition. As it has so many
times before, it may take time and tremendous effort, but most
of all, it will take unity of purpose. As I’ve witnessed throughout
my life in both war and peace. America has never wavered when
her purpose is driven by principle. And in this August day, at
home and broad, I know she will do no less.17
Although standing up for principle was not easy, Bush (1990: 1410)
claimed America had the necessary qualities, moral values, and will to
do so, America’s greatness as a country obligates it to act. In fact,
these characteristics compel the country to a degree that virtually
eliminates the option to choose not to become militarily involved.
Hence, ironically the moral value of the action is reduced.
Six weeks ago we sent our troops half a world away because we
were compelled by the moral compass that guides our nation.
As Americans, we could not ignore this brutally aggressive act…
The highly esteemed political or civic principles worth fighting for
varied throughout the seven months. Originally, Bush (1990: 1216-7)
said the United States was defending four principles: withdrawal of
Iraq from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait’s government, stability and
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security of the Persian Gulf region, and protection of America lives
abroad. These later became the ‘goals’ of the military campaign, and
the term principle was either left undefined or included any number of
values. Most often principle included the New World Order,
international order and the rule of law, fighting aggression, freedom,
sovereignty or integrity, and political stability. Often principles were
stated in colloquial language about keeping our word to friends and
standing up to bullies or outlaws.18 Such language resonates with most
Americans
Active Americans
Activity – whether working, striving, migrating, or being
assertive and ambitious – has always had rhetorical appeal in America.
Its value is exhibited in such phrases as ‘actions speak louder than
worsd’ or ‘forget the talk; let’s see some action’. Thomas Hietala
(1985: 95), in his study of late Jacksonian America, points out that
Americans were viewed as ‘go-ahead’ people – adventurous,
ingenious, inventive, innovative, practical and utilitarian, rather than
contemplative and aesthetic (also Bormann, 1985: 489). To do nothing
was seen as missing the opportunity to reform.
In that vein, Bush denigrated talking, debating, and negotiating.
He (1990: 1243) reminded reporters that, unlike verbose Hussein, ‘I
am not one who flamboyantly believes in throwing a lot of words
around. I’m more interested in action.’ When demonstrators
interrupted a Republican campaign speech in Chicago, Bush (1990:
1603) told his audience, ‘I’m so glad we have free speech here, but
once in a while, you know, we ought to get on with our business.’
Bush’s disdain for words or talk was also indicated in his unwillingness
to allow negotiations, which were equated with ‘compromise’,
‘flexibility’, and ‘appeasement’ and were seen as weakness.
To illustrate that Americans are ‘can-do people’, ‘movers and
shakers’, and go beyond what’s required, Bush employed a number of
heroic anecdotes about individual Americans.19 Most of these
anecdotes were employed during a stint of speeches in support of
various Republican candidates or during his Thanksgiving trip to visit
armed forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. For instance, Bush related
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stories about a man who quickly arranged his wedding when he heard
he was being deployed. ‘You talk about a guy who gets things done!’
Bush (1990: 1270) commented. He relayed other stories about a man
who walked across the country to be able to serve the nation in the
Persian Gulf (1990: 1410); about a 63-year-old grandmother, whose
grandchildren called her ‘Grambo’ because she tried to enlist to serve
in the Gulf (1990: 1461); and about a soldier who wanted to send
Hussein an ‘M.C.Hammer’ tape to show Hussein that if this is how
Americans entertain themselves, ‘imagine how we fight’ (1990:1906).

World leader
Given these unique character qualities and values, it was only
logical that the United States be portrayed as the natural leader of the
world and, as Loren Baritz (1985) says, the one all countries admire
and hope to imitate. Consequently, Bush makes numerous statements
that imply or state directly that other countries look to the United
States for leadership and vision.
He called America the ‘manifestation of humanity’s timeless
yearning to be free’ (1990: 1903) and ‘a beacon of hope and freedom
to the entire world’ (1990: 1410). He then quoted (1990: 1272) Teddy
Roosevelt: America means many things, among them, equality of
rights, and therefore, equality of duty and obligation. You know how
America remains the hope of liberty-loving people everywhere.’
Likewise, although the Persian Gulf military effort was
supposedly precipitated by United Nations resolutions, Bush’s (1990:
1461) discourse indicated the United Nations was following the United
States’ lead, not vice versa:
Our effort is not Republican or Democrat or liberal or
conservative: it is truly American – all American…Not only do we
have 22 nations now, including many Arab states and the Soviet
Union, on our side – well over half the Arab League, a vast
majority – we have freedom and justice on our side. Our goals
have been endorsed by the United Nations Security Council
eight times…[T]here is no substitute for American leadership in
the shaping of a new partnership of nations.
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This last statement eventually became a well-worn slogan of the
seven-month campaign. For Bush, no other nation could meet the
challenge, Bush (1990: 1601, 1603) proclaimed ‘We have the
responsibility to lead the United States does. If we don’t stand up
again aggression around the world when it’s naked and brutal…who
will?’; ‘It is only the United States that can stand for principle.’

Brave and suicidal
If it is only the United States that can do the job, then it is
fortunate that Americans are brave and sacrificial. Both of these
qualities were most frequently applied to the soldiers who illustrated
that ‘America would not be the land of the free if it were not home of
the brave’20 and whose ‘uncommon sacrifice’ was ‘teaching all
[Americans] a lesson about what it means to love liberty and the
precious freedom that gives America its meaning.’21
Bush defined sacrifice variously. In his Veteran’s Day
Proclamation, Bush (1990: 1612) described sacrifice as laying down
life for a friend, or placing one’s self in harm’s way to defend others.
But to a group of Nebraskans, Bush (1990: 1596) said that the
soldiers’ sacrifice was leaving spouses, children, and even Big Red
football to defend our cause.’ The varying language paints a national
identity with which most people can identify, but it also motivates
people to make what sacrifices they can to be part of that identity.
As he did with the ‘active American’ characterization, Bush used
emotion-laden anecdotes, particularly in his campaign speeches, to
make each American feel he/she could contribute to upholding these
virtues. Each American could then be a hero in the myth. The stories
included one about an 8-year-old girl who didn’t want to see her daddy
leave for the Gulf but knew it was necessary to make the world safe
(1990: 1270) and another about a flight nurse who willingly left her
baby to join her husband in the Gulf because, ultimately, they were
fighting for the baby’s future (1990: 1270). These human-interest
stories about ordinary Americans help to define the strength of the
American character under duress, or as Bush (1990: 1270) said, the
protagonists of these stories ‘show the true caliber of America’.
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American national character according to the
peace movement
Unlike Bush’s discourse, which as a presidential discourse set
the tone and established the rhetorical framework of the crisis, peace
movement discourse was more of a reaction to Bush’s policy and
discourse. While one of Bush’s discursive intent was to draw the
people into a motivating national identity, each peace group was
attempting to recruit supporters into its particular collective identity.
Hence, in the discourse of both groups, little overt attention is paid to
defining the American national identity: rather, rhetoric about what
defines America(n) is embedded in the discourse as secondary talk. To
the extent that national identity constructs are present in their
discourse, the two groups distinguish, though inconsistently, among
the American government, America as a country, and the American
people in their characterizations.

America the government
Unlike Bush, who gave little direct attention to characterizing
the American government, the peace movement aimed much of its
discourse at the current Administration or at the government
generally. The peace movement acknowledged that the American
government was formally a democracy and formally had a constitution.
However, it also suggested that the current administration was failing
to follow those principles and, in fact, was interpreting the Constitution
to fit its own needs. Consequently, peace movement discourse
portrayed the American government, not as an example to be
emulated, but as deceptive and manipulative. The government was
hypocritical in its stance opposed to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait,
while allowing the Israeli occupation.22 The Department of Energy had
covered up the dangers of nuclear weapons production and ‘duped’ its
own people.23 The Federal Bureau of Investigation was spying on
Americans.24 The government was using the military to conceal the
fraud that American diplomacy has become, and a significant number
of Americans know that the government lies to them.25 As the war
started, the peace movement charged that the American government
was concealing the actual extent of destruction and death.26
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In addition, peace groups characterized the American
government as the cause of the crisis. According to peace movement
discourse, prior US arms sales and a weak energy policy, in particular,
facilitated Iraq’s ability to attack its neighbor and America’s
dependence on Middle East oil. By placing US government actions in
the active movement, peace movement discourse, attempted to show
that the American government was an active obstacle to peace, rather
than the peacemaker that Bush’s discourse proposed. For instance, the
peace movement charged that Bush ‘ignored U.N. resolutions’ and
‘orchestrated a series of near unanimous Security Council votes with
outright bribes’.27

America the country
On occasion, the MFSN framed America as an example to the
world, but even that couched in the past tense.
We have sent out better images to the world: in our early years
it was that of planters, growers, inventors, superior craftspeople
and artists; then we added to our image as master builders,
manufacturers, teachers, healers. These brought us great
abundance and made us a beacon for countries like those in
Eastern Europe who are adopting many of our cherished ways
by example, where force would surely have failed to make them
do so.28
America was a country originally founded on the principles of freedom
of speech, press, and religion and liberty and justice for all. However,
the MFSN was quick to add that the war was not about these
principles. In fact, the MFSN pointed out that vigilantism or fighting
without good reason ‘is not an unusual idea in our history. There have
always been many who would whip up a posse to go off and join a
fight regardless of the state of our own affairs. Texans seem especially
so disposed’.29
Contrary to the exemplary past that may have existed, both
groups painted current America as a country abusing the rest of the
world and a country in dire straits. As to the former, the peace
movement pointed out that the United States was the only country to
have actually used the atomic bomb against another country.30 Hence,
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it was the United States that should be most feared. In addition, peace
movement discourse described the American ‘way of life’ as largely
consisting of greed, consumption of an unfair share of the world’s
resources, and massive destruction of many life forms.31
In regard to the dire straits depiction, the key words were
‘crumbling’ and ‘falling apart’. Both groups repeatedly indicated that
the country was riddled with social problems – a deteriorating
infrastructure and epidemics of homelessness, AIDS, and racism. It
was a country that didn’t care about its people.
Meanwhile our cities are falling apart, our unions are under
attack everywhere, thousands of people are living in the streets,
our hospitals and schools are collapsing.32
We are witnessing an alarming increase in racism here at
home.33
There is something fundamentally wrong with a society that can
offer ‘equal job opportunity’ only on the field of battle.34
[The nation] doesn’t care about homeless people or education or
health care for the poor as much as it cares about the fate of its
missile systems…35

America the people
Both peace groups initially made one or two statements about
the ‘peace and justice sentiments of the American people’. Both
groups used polling figures to indicate that the majority of American
people were against this war. The MFSN characterized itself as
patriotic (unlike the rest of the peace movement), and insofar as it
also described itself as ‘mainstream, main street American,’ the
group’s discourse implied that most Americans were also patriotic.
However, the general tone of peace movement discourse
portrayed Americans in a more negative light. The peace movement
indicated that Americans were ignorant and easily duped by
government.36 By the end of the war, NCPME, licking its wounds, said
it frequently faced a hostile public opinion and described itself as the
lone moral conscience in a sea of empty patriotic slogans.37 Moreover,
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the earlier characterization of American society as racist, uncaring, and
greedy also impugned the American people, as society is, of course,
comprised of its individual members.

Discussion
Though not normally approached as a means of socialization,
public discourse at time of war offers an occasional, but intensive,
‘teachable moment’ for US leaders to socialize the nation’s members
about the place of their nation in the world community, what values
are American, and what ways of acting are esteemed. Simultaneously,
the officially proffered national identity becomes a contested terrain as
the battle between the Administration and anti-war groups ensues.
In this particular case, President Bush utilized superlative
qualities to entice the nation into a winsome collective identity that
transcends the myriad of identities offered to the public in
contemporary America and invites the people into a collaboration of
virtue. Such identity construction helped to position the United States
in relation to other countries in the international setting. In so doing, it
assigned roles, behaviors, obligations and duties that members agree
need to be carried out even if they as individuals would not support it.
As a member of a nation that is defined as democratic, superior, and
resourceful, the individual may feel resigned to war to fulfill those
obligations to the nation or to the international community, a sacrifice
of the part for the sake of the whole.
Stephen Browne (1991) argues that the essence of rhetoric is to
invite the audience into an alliance in virtue, calling upon the audience
to help the speaker participate in some form of redemption. This
Browne refers to as ‘speaker-hearer collaboration.’ In this case, Bush’s
discourse on America’s superb qualities and its role as the only
qualified leader compelled by morals, obligated by its greatness, and
enabled by the sacrifices of young and old, military and civilian,
implied that it was the responsibility of Americans to support Bush
policies and the troops he deployed. For instance, speaking to an
audience in Florida, Bush (1990: 1331) stressed.
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[There is] strong international support for what your sons and
daughters are doing halfway around the world…
…[T]here is no substitute for the support of the American
people. Under our system, you’re the ones with the power.
You’ve got it in your hands. And I need your support, and I hope
I have it as we continue to stand up against aggression in the
Middle East…I am confident that with your support and the
continued, concerted action of the world community, justice will
prevail over the forces of aggression. [emphases mine]
Bush’s call to collaborate in this collective action creates a sense of
team-work and motivation to participate. The actions required from
the people to exhibit this collective action, such as writing letters or
sending games to the troops, are undemanding. They don’t even have
to give up the Superbowl, and yet they make possible victory over
injustice and American leadership of the world (Bush, 1990: 1465).
However, such participation and membership also effects a
redistribution of accountability. Agency then is shifted from Bush and
his policies to the American people, who become, at least in part,
responsible for the outcome. A lack of collaboration on the part of
Americans, a lack of political will and consensus, could lead to failure
and to the loss of American superiority and leadership position (Bush,
1990: 1362).
While Bush recognized (though only rarely) differences of
opinion on the war or in a democracy generally, he repeatedly
advocated that in this time of foreign policy crisis, those differences he
left at the water’s edge. Instead, unity is the face that should be
shown to the world. This may account for Gallup poll data (December
1990: 9) that indicated that the majority of respondents who opposed
military action (which until the war started was a majority of
respondents) would nevertheless refrain from expressing their
opposition through demonstrations, writing letters, and so forth. Fiftyeight percent of them said they would not take such actions. In
January, however, peace demonstrations occurred at the start of the
war. They were considered to be unusually large for the beginning of a
war. But a majority of respondents (63%) to Gallup’s January 1991
poll indicated that the peace demonstrations were a bad thing for
Americans to do when US troops are fighting overseas (Gallup,
January 1991: 35). In fact, the percent opposed to demonstrations
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was higher among women (67%), even though they were more likely
opposed to military action.
Moreover, as indicated earlier, one of Bush’s goals was to
overcome the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, to dispel the malaise in American
confidence about the nation’s role in the world. The Gallup poll (March
1991: 21) addressed those issues after the war ended. While polling
data have weaknesses and it would be impossible to pinpoint the
cause of the results, the data do indicate that the nation’s perception
of the American identity and role was not disparaged by the war and
its attendant discourse in the eyes of most Americans. Ninety-one
percent of respondents say they had either quiet a lot or a great deal
of confidence in the United States.38 85 percent said the same thing
about the military (this was 17-35 percentage points higher than it
had been at any time since 1973). Confidence in organized religion,
Congress, and television also rose. In addition, 66 percent of
respondents indicated they were satisfied with the way things were
going in the United States, and that was the highest it had been in the
past year. In July 1991, Gallup asked the nation about the US role in
the world. Specifically, the poll asked respondents whether US prestige
and influence had increased around the world. Seventy-nine percent
thought US prestige had increased. Also, the poll inquired whether
respondents thought the US was respected in the world more, less, or
about the same as ten years earlier. Fifty-five percent thought it was
respected more, compared to a 1982 poll in which 65 percent of
respondents said the United States was less respected in the world.
The peace movement, on the other hand, by concentrating its
discursive energy on carving out its own movement identity to recruit
supporters, created, intentionally or not, a weak, uninviting national
identity – a crumbling country full of well-intended but ignorant people
and run by an incompetent, perhaps evil, government. This is an old
strategy on the part of the peace movement, which has been criticized
numerous times for its negativity and inability to relate to the general
public (Ivie, 1987; Harvey, 1991; Miles, 1991). This strategy may
account for the movement’s recent inability to build a sustainable
following.
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Repeated reliance on such a strategy occurs because the peace
movement, particularly in a time of international crisis, faces a
dilemma. As a social movement, its own collective identity is often, if
not always, in opposition to the dominant order. If the movement
attributes a national identity to the United States that is virtuous, it
appears to be feeding into the ethnocentricity, the superiority, and the
‘us v. they’ dichotomy that the dominant collective identity professors.
However, if it creates, wittingly or not, a negative national identity,
even while it may be offering a positive collective movement identity,
it alienates the public, as the urgency of a crisis situation doesn’t allow
any but those already jaundiced by the American way of life to claim
the movement identity over the national identity.
Consequently, the peace movement, particularly NCPME
(because that was one of the main groups that orchestrated the
January demonstrations), was described at best as ‘mainstream’
(Roberts, 1991) but more frequently as ‘poor excuses for Americans’
(Cloud, 1991) and ‘anachronistic’ (Weisberg, 1991). After the war,
even the alternative press counseled the peace movement to stop
shaming Americans into joining the peace movement and to believe
that most Americans are decent (Miles, 1991).
The peace movement needs to consider alternative strategies.
As Antonio Gramsci (1971) has suggested in his analysis of the
relationship of dominant and oppositional ideologies, the peace
movement may need to co-opt some of the elements of dominant
discourse so that it resonates with the larger public and offers them a
national identity that unites them as Americans, calls them to
collaborate in virtue, yet redefines the virtue. According to Gramsci, it
is only logical that subordinate groups would not want to discard the
existing dominant elements altogether, since they were already part of
the generally accepted common sense and therefore carry some
credibility and popularity. Many of the characteristics posed by Bush –
principled and peace-loving, but resolute, determined, steadfast; brave
and sacrificial – were generic in the sense that they could easily be coopted by pro- and anti-war discourse. In fact, while a number of
Bush’s esteemed political values would seem to support the
established geopolitical status quo (and be contrary to peace
movement goals of change), some of those values (new world order,
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collective security) were co-opted originally from peace movement
discourse (Coles, 1998).
This raises another question for future research: To what extent
do these characteristics, posed by Bush as comprising the American
national character, actually resonate with the people? To establish that
both the president and social movements play a role in creating and
defining a national identity does not preclude the possibility that the
nation’s members are oblivious to it or reject it. While Anthony Smith
(1991) asserts that owning the national identity is a means to
immortality, a way to avoid oblivion, as the individual becomes
involved in an identity larger than him- or herself, in an identity that
will likely outlive its individual members, he may be overstating the
extent to which or the context in which individuals actually consciously
claim national identity for themselves. Specifically, where
incongruence between what is offered and what is claimed exists, we
can ask whether there are variations by class, race and ethnicity, or
gender? Public opinion research on war already indicates that women
and ethnic minorities tend to be less supportive of military
interventions and less likely to see any war as a just war (Gallup,
January and February, 1991). To what extent could that be due to a
weaker inclination among these groups to identify with the proffered
national identity?
Finally, the peace movement could choose to advocate a
transnational identity that attempts to draw people into a universal
human identity. This may seem more conducive to a peace movement
that sees nationalism as a reactionary discourse. However, the
predominance of nationalist discourse, exhibited in Bush’s discursive
inclination to define America as above other nations, may confirm
Andersen’s (1991) thesis that a universal identity that transcends
various national identities will have an uphill battle. Although other
nations may seem themselves as determined, peace-loving, and
sacrificial, a transnational identity would have to temper the use of the
superlative and recognize some of the characteristics it claims for itself
as common among all humanity. Some trends, such as globalization
and the redefining of various individual European identities into one
European identity, may be supplying cultural forces toward a universal
identity. However, other trends, such as the rise of ethnic, religious,
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and other civil conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and
Central Asia, still indicate that national, rather than transnational or
universal, identities will remain privileged for some time to come. This
is well illustrated by the younger George Bush’s words as he spoke to
Americans while preparing for war in Afghanistan (Bush, 2001):
I applaud the American people for your courage in a time of
trial. We’re living through a unique moment in American history.
This is a time of rediscovery of heroism and sacrifice and duty
and patriotism. These are core values of our country, and
they’re being renewed…Our forefathers would be proud, really
proud of what they see in America today. They would be proud
of the selfless duty of the fire fighters and police officers of New
York…Our forefathers would salute the modern-day sacrifice of
the brave passengers on Flight 93…Our forefathers would know
and recognize the spirit of unity and patriotism everywhere in
our country…The true character of this great land has been
revealed in adversity. Americans are generous to our neighbors
in need…tolerant toward our fellow citizens…alert to danger, but
calm and determined in the work ahead. And Americans are
reaching out across the world to say: We wage war on the
guilty, not the innocent…Americans know we must act now…We
must stop the evil ones, so our children and grandchildren can
know peace and security and freedom in the greatest nation on
the face of the earth.
As his father before him, Bush’s description of America’s winsome
virtues and ability to sacrifice invites Americans into that identity.
However, Bush links being and doing: being virtuous is insufficient.
Hence, he also invites Americans to complicity in action, action against
the nonvirtuous. Hence, Bush’s rhetorical strategy illustrates the
enduring nature of national identity discourse and assures us that such
discourse will remain powerful and a fruitful resource for farming
foreign policy for some time to come.
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Notes
1. The outcomes of war may include the creation of anthems, new national
heroes and enemies, changes in territorial boundaries and/or ethnic
demographics and a boon to or drain on the economy, all of which
could eventually impact national identity.
2. Of course, the necessary of these dualistic categories can’t be tested, since
humans are created and live in some degree of interaction by their
nature. We will never know if one infant left on an isolated island
would develop a sense of identity.
3. See Grundy and Weinstein (1974: 74) and Farrar (1978: 261) for an
elaboration on the usefulness of this distinction.
4. See Coles, 1995, chapters 6 and 7 for elaboration on Bush’s portrayal of
Hussein.
5. Kennedy’s book is discussed in Zagneki (1992: 372).
6. Quoted in Bostdorff and Goldzwig (1994: 517-18). See also Franklin Henry
Giddings, a rhetoric of Manifest Destiny during the Spanish-American
War, quoted in Grundy and Weinstein (1974: 53).
7. See also ‘Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Religious
Broadcasters.’ January 28, 1991, WCPD 27(5): 89.
8. For example, see Horseman (1981: 35), where he discusses the concept
among the German people; Bass (1995) for a focus on Britain; Baritz
(1964), Galtung (1987), Bormann (1985), and Weinberg (1935), for a
look at US concepts of chosen people. Bormann traces these concepts
back to the Puritan jeremiads of the 1600s, which have their roots in
the Hebrew concept of the Jews as a chosen eople. See Dimont (1971)
for the study of the concept of chosen people in Judaism. Most
recently, see Hackett and Zhao (1994) who argue that America’s
master narrative in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was that of a chosen
nation. Also, Lewis (1987) finds that Reagan relied on the ‘chosen
nation’ myth during his presidency, and Stephanson (1995), makes a
similar finding.
9. See deTocqueville (1948), Lipset (1996), and Shafer (1991) for various
perspectives on American exceptionalism.
10. ‘Radio Address to the Nation on the National Day of Prayer.’ February 2,
1991, WCPD 27(6): 117.
11. Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Tyler, Texas. November 5,
1990, WCPD 26(45): 1760.
12. See, for instance, the ‘Address to the People of Iraq on the Persian Gulf
Crisis’ September 16, 1990, WCPD 26(38): 1390, in which Bush claims
no nation on earth has greater resolve; or the ‘Remarks at a Campaign
Rally for Gubernatorial Candidate, Jim Edgar, in Chicago, Illinois,’
October 16, 1990, WCPD 26(42): 1603, when Bush states that the
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13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

United States is the only nation that can stand for principle; or
similarly in his ‘Remarks at a Campaign Rally for Gubernatorial
Candidate, Pete Wilson, in Los Angeles, California,’ October 26, 1990,
WCPD 26(43): 1668.
For a small portion of such instances, see also ‘Remarks to Department of
Defence Employees,’ August 15, 1990, WCPD 26(33): 1255-1257;
‘Remarks to the Military Airlift Command in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,’
November 22, 1990, WCPD 26(48): 1899; and ‘Remarks and a
Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters Following Discussions
with Allies on the Persian Gulf Crisis,’ December 17, 1990, WCPD
26(51): 2046.
Similarly, see ‘Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in
the Persian Gulf Region,’ August 29, 1990, WCPD 26(35): 1301; ‘The
President’s News Conference,’ January 12, 1991, WCPD 27(3): 39; and
‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union,’ January 29, 1991, WCPD 27(5): 95.
See also ‘Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United
States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia,’ August 8, 1990, WCPD 26(32),
p. 1218; ‘Remarks at the Annual Conference of the Veterans of Foreign
Wars in Baltimore, Maryland,’ August 20, 1990, WCPD 26(34), p.1269;
‘The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis,’ August
30, 1990, WCPD 26(35): 1304; and ‘Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,’
September 11, 1990, WCPD 26(37): 1358-1363, for just a few of the
references to standing by friends.
‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union,’ January 29, 1991, WCPD 27(5): 90; and ‘Remarks to
Community Members at Fort, Steward, Georgia,’ February 1, 1991,
WCPD 27(6): 113.
‘Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States
Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia,’ August 8, 1990, WCPD 26(32): 1218.
See also ‘Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in
the Persian Gulf Region,’ August 29, 1990, WCPD 26(35): 1301; and
‘Remarks at a Republican Reception in Cincinnati, Ohio,’ November 2,
1990, WCPD 26(44): 1733.
For instance, see ‘Remarks to Department of Defence Employers,’ August
15, 1990, WCPD 26(33): 1255-56: ‘Remarks at a Fundraising
Luncheon for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in San Francisco,
California,’ September 19, 1990, WCPD 26(38): 1409; ‘Address to the
Nation Announcing the Deployment of US Armed Forces to Saudi
Arabia,’ August 8, 1990, WCPD 26(32): 1227; ‘Remarks at the Annual
Conference of Veterans of Foreign Wars in Baltimore, Maryland,’
August 20, 1990, WCPD 26(34): 1269; ‘Remarks at a Campaign Rally
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19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

31.

for Gubernatorial Candidate Jim Edgar in Chicago, Illinois,’ October 16,
1990, WCPD 26(42): 1602; and ‘Remarks at a Fundraising Luncheon
for Governor Mike Hayden in Topeka, Kansas,’ September 5, 1990,
WCPD 26(36): 1329.
Occasionally, his concern to show that he and other Americans are always
doing something resulted in absurd or humorous statements. For
instance, toward the beginning of the crisis, Bush took a weekend
vacation in Kennebunkport. Reporters were questioning his ability to
stay ‘on top’ of the crisis from Kennebunkport. When one reporter
asked him what he was going to do that night, he replied, ‘Might go
fishing…or might tee it up…I’m going to sit idly by,’ (‘Exchange with
Reporters Aboard Air Force One on the Persian Gulf Crisis,’ August 10,
1990, WCPD 26(36): 1319.)
‘Remarks at a Fundraising Luncheon for Governor Mike Hayden in Topeka,
Kansas,’ September 6, 1990, WCPD 26(36): 1329. This statement can
be found frequently in Bush’s discourse.
‘Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Manchester, New Hampshire,’
October 23, 1990 WCPD 26(43): 1643; and ‘Remarks at a Funding
Raiding Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate John Rowland in Stanford,
Connecticut,’ October 23, 1990, WCPD 26(34): 1650.
NCPME, ‘Iraq and Palestine: The Bush Administration’s Double Standard
on Occupation,’ Part of a bulk mailing to member organizations,
1/7/91.
Jacobs, Mary, ‘My Turn: A Response to President Bush’s Baloney Dinner
on Thanksgiving,’ A letter written by an MFSN member and mailed to
members and the media, 11/28/90.
Letter written by the Center for Constitutional Rights and distributed in an
NCPME bulk mailing, 1/15/91.
‘Statement to President Bush on the Persian Gulf Crisis by Relatives of
Military Personnel,’ MFSN, 10/10/90, p. 2.
Statement distributed in NCPM bulk mailing, 1/18/91.
‘Draft Political Statement’ of the NCPME, 2/13/91 and ‘Iraq and Palestine:
The Bush Administration’s Double Standard on Occupation,’ a bulk
mailing distributed by the NCPME, 1/2/01, p.1.
‘Remarks for Press Conference in Concord, New Hampshire,’ MFSN state
coordinator Richard Cornelius, 12/6/90, p. 2.
Remarks for Press Conference in Concord, New Hampshire,’ MFSN state
coordinator Richard Cornelius, 12/6/90, p. 1.
Jacobs, Mary, ‘My Turn: A Response to President Bush’s Baloney Dinner
on Thanksgiving,’ A letter written by an MFSN member and mailed to
members and the media, 11/28/90.
Jacobs, Mary, ‘My Turn: A Response to President Bush’s Baloney Dinner
on Thanksgiving,’ A letter written by an MFSN member and mailed to
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32.

33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.

members and the media, 11/28/90, p. 5, and Alex Molnar, ‘If My
Marine Son Is Killed,’ a letter published in The New York Times,
8/23/90.
NCPMF, ‘Bush’s War Drive Sparks Massive Opposition,’ Press release,
January 1991. Also, Jim Grover, Connecticut state MFSN coordinator
speech, January 1991, p. 7.
NCPME letter to membership, 12/31/90, p. 1.
Draft of Op-ed piece included in NCPME bulk mailing, 2/1/91, p. 2.
Jacobs, Mary, ‘My Turn: A Response to President Bush’s Baloney Dinner
on Thanksgiving,’ A letter written by an MFSN member and mailed to
members and the media, 11/28/90.
Letter from Center for Constitutional Rights, included in NCPME bulk
mailign, 1/15/91, and Draft Statement of the NCPME, January 1991.
‘Antiwar Movement Continues,’ NCPME press release, 2/26/91.
This was the first time Gallup had asked this question, so there was no
comparison point.
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